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CONUNDRUMS WITH PENUMBRAS: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY ENCOMPASSES NON-GAMETE PROVIDERS
WHO CREATE PREEMBRYOS WITH THE INTENT TO
BECOME PARENTS
Lainie M. C. Dillon
Abstract: To date, five state high courts have resolved disputes over frozen preembryos.
These disputes arose during divorce proceedings between couples who had previously used
assisted reproduction and cryopreserved excess preembryos. In each case, one spouse wished
to have the preembryos destroyed, while the other wanted to be able to use or donate them in
the future. The parties in these cases invoked the constitutional right to privacy to argue for
dispositional control over the preembryos; two of the five cases were resolved by relying on
this right. The constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions involving procreation,
marriage, and family life. However, when couples use donated sperm or ova to create
preembryos, a unique circumstance arises: one spouse-the gamete provider-is genetically
related to the preembryos and the other is not. If courts resolve frozen preembryo disputes that
involve non-gamete providers based on the constitutional right to privacy, they should find
that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-
gamete providers. Individuals who create preembryos with the intent to become a parent have
made an intimate decision involving procreation, marriage, and family life that falls squarely
within the right to privacy. In such cases, the couple together made the decision to create a
family through the use of assisted reproduction, and the preembryos would not exist but for
that joint decision. Therefore, gamete and non-gamete providers should be afforded equal
constitutional protection in disputes over frozen preembryos.
Leny and Eva were a married couple eager to have a baby.' However,
they were unable to achieve pregnancy through traditional means
because Eva was born with a uterus but no ovaries. In order to have
children, they decided to use Leny's sperm, an anonymous egg donor,
and in vitro fertilization (IVF).: They signed up at an infertility clinic,
which combined Leny's sperm with the donated eggs, and seventeen
preembryos3 resulted. Two preembryos were implanted into Eva's uterus,
I. Hypothetical created by the author.
2. In vitro fertilization is a process by which ova, which are provided by either the intended
mother or a donor, are placed in a medium and then fertilized by sperm, which is provided by either
the intended father or a donor. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 657 (27th ed. 2000). The
preembryo that results is then implanted into a uterus of either the intended mother or a surrogate
and brought to term. Id.
3. "The term 'preembryo' denotes that stage in human development immediately after fertilization
occurs. The preembryo 'comes into existence with the first cell division and lasts until the
appearance of a single primitive streak, which is the first sign of organ differentiation. This
[primitive streak] occurs at about fourteen days of development."' Donna A. Katz, Note, My Egg.
Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen
Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 623, 628-29 n.42 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting
Washington Law Review
and the others were cryopreserved4 for possible use in the future. Eva
gave birth to a healthy child, and they were happy parents. However,
their marriage was troubled and the couple divorced.
During the dissolution proceedings, Leny and Eva disagreed about
how to dispose of the frozen preembryos. Leny wanted to donate them to
an infertile couple, but Eva wanted the opportunity to use the preembryos
herself in the future. Because he had a biological connection to the
preembryos and Eva did not, Leny asserted that the constitutional right to
privacy granted him exclusive control over the preembryos. Eva argued
that the right to privacy also sheltered her interests in the preembryos-
despite the missing biological connection-and granted her an equal
constitutional claim over them.
Only five frozen preembryo disputes between divorcing couples have
reached state high courts.5 Parties have asserted their constitutional right
to privacy in each-usually described in this circumstance as the "right
to procreate" or "right not to procreate"--as a basis for determining
which spouse will control the disposition of the frozen preembryos.6 In
four of the five cases, both parties were gamete providers;7 they
contributed their own cells, or gametes, to the preembryos.' However, it
is also common for people to make use of gamete donors and surrogates,9
as did the couple in a recent Washington State Supreme Court case,
Litowitz v. Litowitz.'o In Litowitz, the Washington State Supreme Court
stated in dicta that because the wife did not have a biological connection
Clifford Grobstein, Human Development from Fertilization to Birth, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 847 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995)).
4. Cryopreservation is a method of preserving the "viability of excised tissues or organs at
extremely low temperatures." STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 432.
5. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (2002); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707
(N.J. 2001); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
6. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600 (stating that "[h]ere, the specific individual freedom in dispute is
the right to procreate"); see also J.B., 783 A.2d at 711 (stating that the husband had asserted his right
to procreate); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 102 Wash. App. 934, 943-44, 10 P.3d 1086, 1092-93 (2000)
(holding that the husband's right not to procreate compelled the court to give him complete control
over the disposition of the preembryos), rev 'd, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (2002).
7. A gamete is "[a]ny germ cell, whether ovum or spermatozoon." STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at
725. A person is a gamete provider if his sperm or her ova are used to create preembryos.
8. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053; J.B., 783 A.2d at 709-10; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175-76; Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 589.
9. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 8-9 (1994).
10. 146 Wash. 2d 514,517,48 P.3d 261, 262 (2002).
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to the preembryos, the only way she could have dispositional control
over them was through the contract she and her husband signed with the
fertility clinic." The Litowitz court thus implied that, if the constitutional
right to privacy had controlled the outcome of the dispute rather than the
contract, the husband's procreational rights would have trumped his
wife's interests merely because he had a biological connection to the
preembryos and she did not.' 2
In resolving frozen preembryo disputes, courts have a choice about
what doctrine to apply: they may enforce a contract if one exists, 3 they
may resolve the dispute based on public policy,'4 they may characterize
the preembryos as marital property and dispose of them accordingly, 5 or
they may apply the right to privacy. 6 If courts apply the constitutional
right to privacy and follow the Washington State Supreme Court's dicta
regarding non-gamete providers, they will significantly, and
unconstitutionally, infringe on non-gamete providers' rights.'7 Instead, if
11. See id. at 527, 48 P.3d at 267.
12. See id. (stating that because the wife did not have a biological connection to the preembryos,
"[any right she may have to the preembryos must be based solely upon contract").
13. See, e.g., Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182; Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d at 533-34, 48 P.3d at 271.
14. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
15. No state high court has yet applied this approach, but scholars and commentators have
recommended it. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Northwest Women's Law Center, at 11, Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 102 Wash. App. 934, 10 P.3d 1086 (2000) (No. 70413-9).
16. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715-17 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
598-605 (Tenn. 1992). Some argue that it is both unnecessary and unwise for courts to apply
constitutional rights to resolve preembryo disputes. See Brief of Amici Curiae Northwest Women's
Law Center, at II (No. 70413-9) (stating that "[blecause this case can and should be decided by
resort to contract or community property law, the constitutional issue, if there is one, should not be
reached"). The amicus brief argues that preembryos are marital property and, therefore, subject to
contract law or equitable distribution under state law. See id. at 5-8. The brief further argues that
there are "unknown and almost certainly undesirable consequences" to applying constitutional rights
to preembryo disputes because doing so could enable once-anonymous gamete donors to claim that
they have procreational rights in preembryos well after their gametic contribution has been made. Id.
at 13-14. See also Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1122-23 (1998) (Arguing that these disputes should not be resolved based
on constitutional rights because when each party possesses a personal right of privacy there is a
constitutional indeterminacy in which neither one is necessarily protected. "In such areas of
constitutional indeterminacy---of tragic choices between competing interests-there is no single
necessarily correct constitutional resolution to a controversy."). This Comment does not seek to
argue that applying constitutional rights is the most desirable means to resolve preembryo disputes;
instead, it seeks to argue that if courts do apply a constitutional rights balancing test to resolve such
disputes, they should find that the right to privacy applies equally to gamete and non-gamete
providers.
17. While a court may also apply the constitution of its own state, this Comment concerns only
the application of the federal constitutional right to privacy.
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courts apply constitutional principles in preembryo disputes where one
party is a gamete provider and the other is not, they should find that the
right to privacy protects both parties' interests in the preembryos.
Support for this approach can be found in the analogous area of family
law where intent, not biology, determines parentage. 8 As in parentage
law, intent should determine whose interests the constitutional right to
privacy protects in disputes over frozen preembryos.
This Comment argues that because the constitutional right to privacy
broadly protects intimate decisions related to procreation, marriage and
family life, a non-gamete provider's intimate decision to create
preembryos falls squarely within the zone of privacy protected by the
federal Constitution. Part I describes the history of the constitutional
right to privacy and its protection of intimate decisions related to
procreation, marriage and family life. Part II discusses how courts have
thus far applied the right to privacy to disputes over frozen preembryos.
Part III provides an overview of parentage law, where intent is used to
determine parentage for children born from the use of assisted
reproduction.' 9 In Part IV, this Comment argues that in deciding whether
the right to privacy encompasses the decision to create preembryos,
courts should find that the Constitution protects both gamete and non-
gamete providers. The creation of preembryos with the intent to become
a parent is an intimate decision that is fundamental to procreation and
family. Therefore, it falls squarely within the constitutional right to
privacy-regardless of a biological connection.
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY PROVIDES BROAD PROTECTION
OVER INTIMATE DECISIONS CENTRAL TO PROCREATION,
MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY LIFE
The United States Supreme Court, in its constitutional jurisprudence,
has consistently applied the right to privacy to protect intimate decisions
central to procreation, marriage, and family.2 ° The Court began to define
18. See infra Part I11.
19. Assisted reproduction is a general term for the various methods of achieving pregnancy
besides sexual intercourse. These include intrauterine insemination, egg donation, embryo donation,
in vitro fertilization, and sperm injection. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597
(2002).
20. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (abortion); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153-54 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (use of contraception by
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the nature of this right in seminal cases prior to its explicit recognition of
the right to privacy.2 The Court has held that the U.S. Constitution
protects both an individual's basic procreative autonomy22 as well as the
broader decisions involved with the rearing of one's children.23 The
Court later built on that foundation by explicitly stating that a right to
privacy exists in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights.24 The Court has
since applied this right to strike down laws that unduly restricted
marriage, 5  contraception,26  family relationships, 27  child rearing and
education.28
A. Origins of the Right to Privacy
The genesis of the constitutional right to privacy can be found in
Skinner v. Oklahoma,29 Pierce v. Society of Sisters3" and Meyer v.
Nebraska.3' In Skinner, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right to
procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man. 32 In striking down a
state law that sought to sterilize certain types of criminals, the Court held
that the law was unconstitutional in part because "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."
33
unmarried individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (use of contraception by married couples).
21. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that procreation involves
the basic civil rights of man); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating that
the right to educate is fundamental to marriage and child rearing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399-401 (1923) (stating that the concept of liberty includes the right to learn a foreign language).
22. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
23. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401.
24. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
25. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (striking down a law that criminalized interracial marriage).
26. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
27. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-97, 503-06 (1977) (holding that the
state cannot prevent a grandmother from living with her grandchildren); see also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that there is a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter").
28. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402-03 (holding that the city cannot prevent the teaching of foreign
languages in elementary schools); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that the state cannot prevent
parents from educating their children in private or parochial schools).
29. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
30. 268 U.S. 510(1925).
31. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
33. Id.
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Pierce and Meyer were the first Supreme Court cases to broadly
characterize the general area of family life as sheltered from state
intrusion.34 In Pierce, the Court struck down a law requiring children to
attend public schools.35 The Court based its decision on a parent's right
to educate his or her children in a school of his or her choice, whether
public, private or parochial. 36 The Court held that this right to choose
how to educate one's children stems from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, which protect decisions that are fundamental to marriage
and child rearing.37
In Meyer, an elementary school teacher taught German to a ten-year-
old in violation of a state statute that prohibited teaching foreign
languages in elementary schools. 38 The Court held that the statute
violated the Constitution because the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of liberty protects the right of a teacher to teach and of students to
acquire knowledge.39  The Court noted that this protection also
encompasses:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 4°
Forty years after Meyer, in Griswold v. Connecticut,41 the Supreme Court
explicitly identified this broad shelter as the right to privacy.4"
34. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1989) (stating that
Pierce and Meyer "may be seen as the true parents of the privacy doctrine" and that today these
cases are frequently classified with other privacy cases); see also Rao, supra note 16, at 1093
(stating that the right to privacy's earliest origins lie in these two cases); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (stating that "[a] host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925), have consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter').
35. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
36. See id. at 535.
37. See id. at 534-35.
38. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
39. See id. at 399-401; see also RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 612 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court determined in Meyer that under
the Fourteenth Amendment individuals have certain fundamental rights which must be respected by
state law, including private decisions related to education).
40. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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B. The Right to Privacy Protects Intimate Decisions Related to
Procreation
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly state that there is a right to
privacy, but "the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the
Constitution. 43 This right emanates from the penumbras of the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, which shelter individuals from
government intrusion into speech, religion, assembly, and one's home
and property." The constitutional right to privacy is also based in the
Fourteenth Amendment,45 which provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."46
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the right to privacy to
strike down a Connecticut law making it illegal for a married couple to
use "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception .... -"" The Court viewed the law as an undue
intrusion on an intimate decision central to marriage, which the court
recognized as "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."48 These guarantees
include those found in the First,49 Third,50 Fourth," Fifth52 and Ninth53
Amendments.
42. See id. at 484-86; see also Rao, supra note 16, at 1095 (stating that Griswold was the first
case in which the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right to privacy).
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); see also Vincent F. Stempel, Procreative Rights in
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Why the Angst?, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (1999) (stating that
although the Constitution does not specifically refer to a right of privacy, over the years the Supreme
Court has developed the doctrine of the right to privacy).
44. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Stempel, supra note 43, at
1193 (stating that the Court has identified the penumbras of the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights as the source of the right to privacy).
45. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Griswold, 281 U.S. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958 rev.) (repealed 1971)).
48. See id. at 484-86; see also ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION,
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 11 (1995) (stating that in Griswold the
Supreme Court forged a right of marital privacy based on the First Amendment right of association,
the Third Amendment prohibition against quartering soldiers in peacetime, the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment's vesting of rights not enumerated in the Constitution).
49. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment" is one of the rights that defines the zone of privacy.).
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While the Court in Griswold explicitly expressed a desire to protect
decisions that are fundamental to marriage, it also made clear in later
cases that the right to privacy extends beyond the marital context. 4 For
example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird5 the Court struck down a Massachusetts
law that made it a crime to distribute contraceptive devices to unmarried
persons. 6  The Court held that the statute was analogously
unconstitutional to the Connecticut law in Griswold" and concluded that,
"whatever the rights of the individual to access ... contraceptives may
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married
alike. 58 Procreational rights, the Court stated, are fundamental to every
individual: "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."59
The Supreme Court further extended the right to privacy in Roe v.
Wade,6" in which the Court held that pregnant women have a right to an
abortion under some circumstances. 6 Because the constitutional right to
privacy protects the decision of whether and how to create a family, the
Court determined that a woman has a right to have an abortion unless
there is a sufficiently compelling state interest to prevent it.62 Therefore,
in Roe, the Court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited abortion
50. See id. ("The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any
house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.").
51. See id. ("The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."').
52. See id. ("The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.").
53. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend IX, which provides: "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people").
54. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
55. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
56. See id. at 454-55.
57. See id. at 445-49.
58. Id. at 453.
59. Id. (emphasis added); see also Stempel, supra note 43, at 1193-94 (stating that individual
privacy rights were first set forth in Eisenstadt).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 1. See id. at 164-65.
62. See id. at 154, 163 (holding that a state may not regulate abortion before viability because
"[w]ith respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling'
point is at viability"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (stating that
"[b]efore viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or
the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure").
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except when necessary to save the life of the woman, holding that the
right to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 63 Moreover, in a subsequent
case addressing abortion rights, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,64 the
Court reaffirmed that the right to privacy protects "the liberty relating to
intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to
beget or bear a child.,
65
C. The Right to Privacy is a Broad Protection Encompassing the Right
to Marry, the Right to Live with One s Family, and Other Intimate
Decisions Central to Highly Personal Relationships
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended the right to privacy to include
situations involving marriage and living arrangements, 66 and the Court
has refused to apply it to situations that do not involve highly personal
67 6family decisions. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,68 the Court held
that a Virginia law criminalizing interracial marriage violated the Equal
Protection clause.69 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren
drew on preceding cases stating that the Constitution protected decisions
related to marriage.70 He explained that "[t]he freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."'" Justice Warren went on to
specifically note that the right to privacy protects one's decision of
whom to marry because "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."72
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
65. Id. at 857 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
66. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (applying the right to privacy to marriage);
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (applying the right to privacy to living arrangements).
67. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984) (refusing to apply the right to
privacy to a men's club); see also Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n. 13 (1973) (stating
that because "the constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate
relationship," it does not encompass the right to watch obscene movies in public theaters).
68. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. See id. at 12.
70. See id. at 7 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942)).
71. Id. at 12.
72. See id. (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
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Familial living arrangements may also fall within the "private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter., 73 In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,74 the Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance that
limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a nuclear family,
thereby making it a crime for a woman to have her grandchildren live
with her. 75 East Cleveland defended the law by arguing that the right to
privacy did not extend beyond the nuclear family, because the Court had
thus far only applied it to parent-child relationships. 76 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the constitutional protection
of the "sanctity of the family" includes one's extended family.77 This
protection applies broadly to families, the Court explained, because "[i]t
is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural. 78
The Supreme Court has further delineated the scope of the right to
privacy by limiting it to highly personal family decisions. 79 For example,
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,8" the Court held that members of an
all-male organization did not have a constitutional right to exclude
women, because the organization was not the type of "highly personal
relationship" the Constitution seeks to protect.8' In its holding, the Court
emphasized that constitutional protection extends to those relationships
that "attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage,
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with
one's relatives."82 Thus, the nature and activities of the Jaycees fell
outside the zone of privacy protected by the Constitution.83
In sum, the constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions
central to procreation, marriage and family life. As indicated by Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the constitutional right to privacy is very broad. Its
protection ranges from the intimate decisions related to creating a
73. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (citing Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
74. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
75. See id. at 495-97.
76. See id. at 500.
77. See id. at 503-06.
78. See id. at 503-04.
79. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984).
80. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
81. See id. at 618-20 (finding that the Jaycees were the type of organization clearly "outside of
the category of relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional protection").
82. Id. at 619 (internal citations omitted).
83. See id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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family-such as whom to marry and whether to have children-to
decisions related to child-rearing and living arrangements.
i1. FIVE STATE HIGH COURTS HAVE RESOLVED
PREEMBRYO DISPUTES
Five state high courts have examined the issue of who has
dispositional control over frozen preembryos upon divorce.84 The
constitutional right to privacy was raised in each, but only two courts
dealt with it directly.85 Those courts undertook a two-step process to
resolve the disputes: first, they determined whether both spouses had
constitutional rights in the preembryos; second, after concluding that
they had equal constitutional rights, the courts weighed the spouses'
competing interests in the frozen preembryos.86 The three courts that
avoided the constitutional issues nonetheless acknowledged that
preembryo disputes raise constitutional privacy issues.87
A. Courts Have Resolved Preembryo Disputes Based on the
Constitutional Right to Privacy
In disputes over frozen preembryos, parties have consistently asserted
their constitutional privacy rights in arguing for dispositional control
over the preembryos.88 The Supreme Court of Tennessee was the first
84. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (2002); JB. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707
(N.J. 2001); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.
1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
85. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (stating that the wife's "fundamental right not to procreate" would
be "irrevocably extinguished" if a surrogate were allowed to bear her preembryos); Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 602 (stating that "however far the protection of procreational autonomy extends, the
existence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers").
86. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601, 603-05 (stating that "Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis
must be seen as entirely equivalent gamete-providers" and then proceeding to balance each party's
interests); see also JB., 783 A.2d at 715-17 (stating that "the claims before us derive, in part, from
concepts found in the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of this State" and proceeding to
balance each party's interests).
87. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 (resolved based on a contract); A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1059
(resolved based on public policy); Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d at 533-34, 48 P.3d at 271 (resolved based
on a contract). See also infra Part ll.B.
88. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 711 (stating that the husband had asserted his right to procreate); Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 600 (determining that "[h]ere, the specific individual freedom in dispute is the right to
procreate"); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 102 Wash. App. 934, 944-45, 10 P.3d 1086, 1092-93 (2002)
(holding that David Litowitz, as a progenitor, had a right to procreate), rev'd, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 48
P.3d 261 (2002).
Washington Law Review
state high court to resolve such a dispute.8 9 In Davis v. Davis,90 a
Tennessee couple divorced after previously undergoing in vitro
fertilization (IVF) and freezing preembryos for possible use in the
future. 9' Because the couple had used the wife's ova and the husband's
sperm to create the preembryos, they were both the gamete providers and
the intended parents.92 Upon divorce, the couple disagreed about what
should be done with the preembryos.93 The wife, Mary Sue Davis,
wished to have the preembryos donated to an infertile couple, while the
husband, Junior Davis, wanted them either to remain frozen or to be
discarded.94
The Supreme Court of Tennessee engaged in a constitutional rights
balancing test to resolve the dispute. 95 First, the court determined that
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis both had privacy rights in the
preembryos because "the right of procreation is a vital part of an
individual's right to privacy. 96 To reach this conclusion, the court
analogized control over preembryos to those acts the U.S. Supreme Court
has explicitly stated fall under the right to privacy, such as the right to
use contraception and to have an abortion. 97 Because the court
determined that both spouses had equal constitutional rights in the
preembryos, its second step was to compare their competing interests in
them.98 The Davis court reasoned that Mary Sue's interest in the
preembryos was the "burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures
she underwent were futile."99 The court based Junior's interests in the
preembryos on his strong desire to avoid unwanted fatherhood.'00 The
89. See Stempel, supra note 43, at 1192 (stating that Davis was the first case to deal directly with
the issue of frozen preembryos).
90. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
91. See id. at 589.
92. See id. at 591-92.
93. See id. at 589.
94. See id. at 589-90.
95. See id. at 598-605.
96. See id. at 600.
97. See id. at 600-03 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)).
98. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
99. See id. at 604.
100. Junior Davis had been a child of divorce and was "vehemently opposed" to becoming the
father to a child that would not live with both parents. See id. at 603-04. His concerns included both
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court concluded that Junior Davis's interests were more compelling, and,
therefore, the preembryos were destroyed.'' Notably, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee also stated that Mary Sue's interests would have been
stronger if she had wanted to use the preembryos for herself and if they
were the only means by which she could become a parent. 102
In J.B. v. MB.,' °3 the Supreme Court of New Jersey echoed the
Tennessee court's determination that individuals have constitutional
rights in their frozen preembryos.0 4 In J.B., a New Jersey couple
divorced after previously undergoing IVF and freezing preembryos.'0 5 As
in Davis, both parties were gamete providers0 6 who disagreed about
what should be done with the preembryos; the husband wanted to donate
them to an infertile couple, while the wife wanted them destroyed.0 7
Both parties argued that they had a constitutional right, rooted in the
right to privacy, to control the disposition of the preembryos.0 8 Like the
Davis court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey engaged in a
constitutional rights balancing test to resolve the dispute.'0 9 The court
first considered whether the Constitution protected both spouses'
interests, and, as in Davis, the court held that the right to privacy
protected both the husband and wife's interests in the preembryos."'
Next, the court compared the parties' competing interests and concluded
that the wife's procreational rights would be "irrevocably extinguished"
if her husband was allowed to have the preembryos implanted in another
woman against the wife's wishes."' Therefore, the J.B. court ordered the
preembryos destroyed.'"
the suffering he perceived the child would endure as well as the burdens that would be placed on him
as a parent. Id.
101. See id. at 604-05.
102. See id. at 604.
103. 783 A.2d 707 (N.Y. 2001).
104. See id. at 715-17.
105. See id. at 710.
106. See id. at 708-10.
107. See id. at 710.
108. See id. at 712.
109. See id. at 715-16 (reasoning that the decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) "provide a framework within which disputes over the disposition of preembryos can
be resolved").
110. See id. at 715-17.
I1l. Seeid. at717.
112. See id. at 720.
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In both Davis and J.B., the courts made it clear that the parties'
constitutional rights in the preembryos were equal."' The Tennessee
court explicitly stated that, "[a]s they stand on the brink of potential
parenthood, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis must be seen as
entirely equivalent gamete-providers."' " Therefore, under the
constitutional right to privacy, both individuals had an equal right to
determine the fate of the preembryos, because neither spouse had an
inherently more compelling constitutional right than the other." 5
Consequently, the courts proceeded to the second step of balancing the
parties' competing interests." 16
B. Courts That Have Resolved Preembryo Disputes Without Relying
on the Constitution Have Nonetheless Indicated That Such Disputes
Implicate the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Even when courts have resolved preembryo disputes without relying
on the constitutional right to privacy, they have acknowledged that the
creation of preembryos implicates the right.'7 For example, in Kass v.
Kass,'" New York's highest court enforced a dispositional agreement the
divorcing couple had made at the time they began the IVF procedure.'"
The contract stated that if the couple was ever unable to mutually agree
about the disposition of the preembryos, the IVF clinic should donate
them to research. 20 Though the court decided the case based on the
contract, it also noted that the dispositional control of preembryos is "a
quintessentially personal, private decision."''
113. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 501 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716
(N.J. 2001).
114. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
115. Id. at 603.
116. See id. (stating that the court would consider both spouses' interests by examining "the
positions of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that w[ould] be
imposed by differing resolutions"); see also JB., 783 A.2d at 716-17.
117. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (2002); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725
N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
118. 696 N.E,2d 174 (1998).
119. See id. at 182.
120. See id. at 176-77 (noting the contract specifically stated that "[i]n the event that we ... are
unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now
indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct [that] ... [ojur frozen pre-
zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF
Program for approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program").
121. Id. at 180.
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In A.Z. v. B.Z.,'22 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
similarly recognized the privacy interest that individuals have in their
preembryos.' 23 In A.Z., the court refused to enforce a contract between a
divorcing couple on the basis that it violated Massachusetts public
policy.'24 The agreement stated that in the event that the couple failed to
mutually agree about the disposition of the preembryos, the wife would
have full control over them.'25 The court held that public policy
prevented it from enforcing the contract, because the husband had
changed his mind about becoming a parent.'26 This decision, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, "enhances the 'freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life."" 27
The Washington State Supreme Court confronted this issue in Litowitz
v. Litowitz,'28 although in somewhat different circumstances. In Litowitz,
a couple created preembryos during their marriage by using the sperm of
the husband, David Litowitz, and ova from an anonymous egg donor.2 9
Thus, unlike the other preembryo disputes, the wife, Becky Litowitz, was
a non-gamete provider. 3 ° Before the couple divorced, they had a
preernbryo implanted into a surrogate,' 3' and they cryopreserved the
excess preembryos for possible future use.'32 Upon divorce, David
Litowitz wanted the remaining preembryos destroyed or donated to an
infertile couple, while Becky Litowitz wanted them implanted in a
surrogate and brought to term.
133
While the Washington State Supreme Court resolved the dispute on
contract grounds,'34 it stated in dicta that it would not extend the right to
privacy to non-gamete providers.'3 5 The court reasoned that because
122. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
123 See id. at 1059.
124. See id. at 1056.
125. See id. at 1054 (the agreement stated that if the husband and wife "[s]hould become
separated, [they] both agree[d] to have the embryo(s) ... retum[ed] to [the] wife for implant").
126. See id. at 1059.
127. See id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
128. 146 Wash. 2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (2002).
129. See id. at 517, 48 P.3d at 262.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 517, 48 P.3d at 262-63.
133. See id. at 520, 48 P.3d at 264.
134. See id. at 533-34, 48 P.3d at 271.
135. See id. at 527, 48 P.3d at 267.
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Becky Litowitz did not have a biological connection to the preembryos,
"[a]ny right she may have to the preembryos must be based solely upon
contract.' 36 In other words, the Washington court suggested that when
an individual decides to have a child through IVF, his or her rights and
obligations to those preembryos stem solely from contractual or
biological grounds. 37 Significantly, by the time of the divorce, Becky
and David Litowitz's child had been born.' Becky Litowitz's legal
status as the child's mother was never questioned, despite her lack of a
biological connection and the use of an egg donor and surrogate.
Nevertheless, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that "any"
right to the preembryos would be based "solely" upon contract and, thus,
that Becky Litowitz did not possess a constitutionally protected privacy
interest in the preembryos.
In sum, the constitutional right to privacy consistently arises in
disputes over the fate of frozen preembryos. To date, two state high
courts have applied constitutional rights to resolve such disputes. 39
Significantly, even courts that resolved the disputes on non-constitutional
grounds agreed that preembryo disputes implicate privacy rights.
However, in one case, Litowitz, a court suggested in dicta that non-
gamete providers do not have a constitutional right to control the
disposition of their preembryos. If courts follow this approach in future
cases, non-gamete providers will be denied privacy rights in preembryos
solely because they lack a biological connection.
III. FOR CHILDREN BORN FROM ASSISTED REPRODUCTION,
INTENT-NOT BIOLOGY-DEFINES LEGAL PARENTAGE
Children born from the use of assisted reproduction are often not
biologically related to their parents; they may be born from processes
that involve sperm donation, egg donation, surrogacy, or a combination
thereof.4 Because biological connections do not necessarily indicate
who the parents of such children are,' 4 ' the law increasingly looks to the
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 517, 48 P.3d at 262.
139. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-605 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707,
715-17 (N.J. 2001).
140. See ROBERTSON, supra note 9.
141. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEASY AGE 174 (1997) (stating that it is now recognized that biological connections do not
securely anchor society's understanding of the family).
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intent of the participants in the reproductive process to determine their
legal rights. 142 The Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (UPA) applies the
intent doctrine to determine the rights of individuals who use assisted
reproduction.'43 Under this doctrine, those who intend to create a family
are the legal parents to children that result,114 while those who do not
intend to create a family-such as anonymous gamete donors-do not
have parental rights. 45  Case law also uses intent, not biology, to
determine parentage. 146 In some cases, courts have required individuals
with no biological connection to a child to uphold their parental
obligations because they intended to create a family. 47 In other cases,
courts have denied parentage rights to individuals with a biological
connection to a child because they lacked the initial intent to create a
family.
48
A. The Uniform Parentage Act Calls for the Use of lntent to
Determine Parentage of Children Born From Assisted
Reproduction
Children born from the use of egg or sperm donation are not
biologically related to one or both parents; therefore, intent has emerged
as the primary analysis for determining legal parenthood. 49 The UPA,
142. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702 and 703, 9B U.L.A. 355-56 (2000) (stating that a gamete
donor is not a parent to a child that is conceived by means of assisted reproduction and that a
husband is the father of a child resulting from assisted reproduction if he consented to the use of
assisted reproduction); see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (determining that the intended parents are the legal parents to a child born from an egg
donor, sperm donor, and surrogate mother); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993)
(granting maternity rights to the gamete-provider mother over the surrogate mother because the
preembryos would not exist but for the gamete-provider mother's intent to have children);
McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (granting maternity rights to
the intended mother, who was also the gestational mother).
143. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (stating that a sperm or egg donor is not
the parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction).
144. See id. at § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356 (stating that ifa husband consents to assisted reproduction by
his wife he is the father of a resulting child, regardless of whether he provided sperm or not).
145. See id. at § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (stating that a sperm or egg donor is not the parent of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction).
146. See, e.g., Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782-87; McDonald, 608
N.Y.S.2d at 480.
147. See infra Part II.B.
148. See infra Part III.B.
149. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 410-11. The UPA legitimizes the use of
assisted reproduction by stating that it is among a handful of ways that legal parenthood may be
established. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 201, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2000). Under the UPA, the other
Washington Law Review
declares that in the context of assisted reproduction, intent, not biology,
is determinative of one's legal status as a parent."O Nineteen states have
fully adopted the UPA, while many others have partially adopted it.'5 '
For both egg and sperm donation, the UPA states that the intended
parents are the legal parents: "[i]f a husband provides sperm for, or
consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife ... he is the father of a
resulting child."' 52 Conversely, a donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction.'53 Thus, intent determines
parentage in the context of assisted reproduction.
B. Courts Also Rely on Intent to Resolve Parentage Disputes
Case law resolving parentage disputes is in line with the UPA's
approach.'54 Courts base parentage rights for children born from assisted
reproduction on intent: specifically, whether the individual acted to bring
about the birth of a child with the intent to raise it as his or her own. 5
For example, in In re Marriage of Buzzanca 56 a child, Jaycee, was born
with five potential parents: an anonymous egg donor, an anonymous
sperm donor, a gestational mother, and the husband and wife who
intended to be the parents.'57 Upon divorce, which occurred shortly
before the child was born, the intended father claimed that he did not
ways to establish parenthood are: birth, an unrebutted presumption of paternity, gestational
agreement, adoption, acknowledgment, and adjudication. See id.
150. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 7, 9B U.L.A. 354-59.
151. See id. at Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 296-98 (stating that the previous version had been fully
adopted in nineteen states and partially adopted in many additional states).
152. See id. at § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356.
153. See id. at § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355.
154. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
155. See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in
Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R.5th 567 (2000); see also Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and hItent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L. REV.
297, 323 (stating that "[w]ithin the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood"); Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293-94 (determining that the intended parents are the
legal parents to child born from egg donor, sperm donor, and surrogate mother); Johnson, 851 P.2d
at 787; McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (granting maternity rights to the intended mother, who was
also the gestational mother).
156. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
157. See id. at 282.
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have any legal obligation to pay child support.'58 He based this claim on
the fact that he was not biologically related to Jaycee.'59 A California
appeals court rejected the husband's argument and held that he was
obligated to pay child support because of his intent to create and parent a
child. 6 ' Division Four of the California Court of Appeal acknowledged
that it was an undisputed fact that Jaycee would not have been born but
for the intended parents' agreement to implant a fertilized egg in a
surrogate. 161 Furthermore, the court held that the husband's intent and
affirmative act of proceeding with the surrogacy agreement were
conclusive "parenthood" under the common law doctrine of estoppel.1
62
The California court stated a clear rule: when "a child is procreated
because a medical procedure was initiated and consented to by intended
parents," the intended parents are the legal parents of the child.
163
Similarly, in Johnson v. Calvert,'64 the California Supreme Court
relied on the intent of the parties to resolve a maternity dispute. 65 In
Johnson, a husband and wife contracted with a surrogate mother to
gestate a child on their behalf'6 6 The surrogate mother asserted maternity
rights based on her biological connection to the child formed through
gestation and birth, despite the fact that the husband and wife provided
both gametes and were therefore the genetic parents of the child. 167 The
surrogate mother claimed that her biological connection gave her a
constitutional right to be the legal mother to the child. 168 The California
Supreme Court resolved the maternity dispute by relying on the intent of
the parties when they undertook the procreational process. 169 The court
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 292, 294.
161. See 2 WEST GROUP, PRACTIONER TREATISE SERIES, HEALTH LAW 406-07 (2d ed. 2000).
162. See id.
163. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
164. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
165. See id at 782; see also DOLGIN, supra note 141, at 185 (stating that the Johnson court used
intent to represent a "a symbol of familial connection, as a new alternative to terms such as blood
and genes, which constitute the connection between generations").
166. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777.
167. See id. at 778.
168. See id. at 785.
169. See id. at 782; see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that in Johnson "motherhood could have been 'established' in either of two women
under the Act, and the tie [was] broken by noting the intent to parent as expressed in the surrogacy
contract").
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denied maternity rights to the surrogate mother170 despite acknowledging
that giving birth to the child gave her a biological connection sufficient
for maternity under California law.'7 ' The court based its decision on the
reasoning that "[a] woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy
arrangement is not exercising her own right to make procreative
choices."' 72 The court held that the wife was the legal mother because
"from the outset [she had] intended to be the child's mother"'73 and
because the child would not have been born but for the couple's desire
and acts to create a family.'74 The California Supreme Court focused on
the fact that the couple "affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and
took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization."''
71
In McDonald v. McDonald, 7' a New York appellate court also used
intent to grant maternity rights to a woman not genetically related to her
children. 177 In McDonald, a husband argued that his wife did not have
maternity rights to their children because she was not their genetic
mother. 17" The couple had combined donor eggs with the husband's
sperm to create the preembryos, which were implanted in the wife and
resulted in her giving birth to twins. 79 Upon divorce, the husband argued
that the children should either be found illegitimate or "genetically and
legally plaintiffs" so that his wife would be denied parentage rights."' In
rejecting the husband's argument, the court explicitly adopted the
reasoning used in Johnson v. Calvert to hold that the wife was the legal
mother of the twins because-despite her missing genetic connection-
she had the necessary intent to create a family."'
170. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787.
171. See id. at 781 (stating that because there was "undisputed evidence that [the surrogate
mother], not [the gamete provider], gave birth to the child... [b]oth women thus have adduced
evidence of a mother and child relationship as contemplated by the Act") (citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 7003, 7004, 7015 (West 1970); CAL. EVID. CODE, §§ 621, 892 (West 1966)).
172. Id.
173. See id at 782.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
177. See id. at 480.
178. See id. at 479.
179. See id. at 478.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 480 (stating that "in the instant 'egg donation' case, the wife, who is the gestational
mother, is the natural mother of the children").
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In sum, intent, rather than biological connections, determines
parentage for children born from the use of assisted reproduction. Both
the Uniform Parentage Act and case law have adopted this approach.
Therefore, individuals without a biological connection may nonetheless
have parentage obligations, and individuals who do have a biological
connection may nonetheless be denied parentage rights.
IV. THE CREATION OF PREEMBRYOS IS AN INTIMATE
DECISION ABOUT WHETHER TO HAVE CHILDREN AND,
AS SUCH, FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE ZONE OF
PRIVACY PROTECTED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The constitutional right to privacy broadly protects intimate decisions
central to procreation, marriage and family life.'82 The decision to create
preembryos in order to have children is as intimate and central to family
life as procreational decisions involving contraception and abortion. As
such, it falls squarely within the zone of privacy protected by the U.S.
Constitution. 3 Because both gamete and non-gamete providers using
assisted reproduction have made the intimate decision to create a family,
the right to privacy's broad shield over decisions related to procreation,
marriage and family life should protect them both. Thus, courts
determining dispositional control over preembryos should consider the
constitutional interests of both gamete and non-gamete providers equally.
Courts have erred in this consideration to the extent that they have
chained these interests to a biological connection.
184
Rather than looking to biology to find that one party has a privacy
interest in the preembryos and the other does not, courts should look to
the intent of the parties who participated in the creation of the
preembryos. Intent is a well-established method for determining
parentage in family law'85 and provides a useful analogy to resolving
preembryo disputes. In family law, a biological connection is not
required to establish parentage-what matters is the intent of the parties
to become parents.86 Similarly, in the preembryo context, parties who
intend to create a family have each made the intimate decision to
182. See supra Part 1.
183. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992).
184. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (2002).
185. See supra Part I11.
186. See supra Part I I.
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procreate and, therefore, should be equally protected by the
constitutional right to privacy.
A. Courts Have Properly Applied Privacy Rights in Preembryo
Disputes, Except to the Extent They Have Made the Right to
Privacy Dependent Upon Biology
In each of the five cases decided by state high courts, disputes over
frozen preembryos have implicated the right to privacy." 7 In two of those
cases, Davis v. Davis and J.B. v. MB., the courts explicitly applied the
constitutional right to privacy and balanced the parties' interests. 8 The
courts in Davis and J.B. were correct in so far as they recognized that
individuals have a privacy interest in their preembryos.'89 But, they were
incorrect to the extent that they tied the right to privacy to a biological
connection."'
Furthermore, the Washington State Supreme Court incorrectly stated
in Litowitz v. Litowitz that the right to privacy requires a biological
connection in order to protect one's constitutional interest in
preembryos.' 9 ' The court failed to recognize the intimate nature of that
couple's decision-made within the highly personal relationship of their
marriage-to create preembryos in order to become parents. If courts add
a biological requirement to the right to privacy, they will fail to
recognize that the use of assisted reproduction to create preembryos in
order to have children is an intimate decision that falls squarely within
the zone of privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution.
187. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 146 Wash. 2d 514; J.B., 783 A.2d 707; A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
188. SeeJB., 783 A.2d at 715-17; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
189. See JB., 783 A.2d at 715-17; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
190. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 (stating that "decisional authority rests in the gamete-
providers alone, at least to the extent that their decisions have an impact upon their individual
reproductive status" because "no other person or entity has an interest sufficient to permit
interference with the gamete-providers' decision to continue or terminate the IVF process, because
no one else bears the consequences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do").
191. See Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d at 527, 48 P.3d at 267.
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B. The Right to Privacy Protects the Extremely Personal Decision of
Whether to Create Preembryos in Order to Have Children
The right to privacy is sufficiently broad to encompass the intimate
decision to create a family via assisted reproduction.192 The Washington
State Supreme Court's dicta in Litowitz to the contrary utterly fails to
recognize the breadth of the right to privacy. The U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged the broad scope of the right to privacy in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, where the Court concluded that the right to privacy protected an
individual's decision to use contraception.' 93 The Court held that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."'9 4 The Court has also held that the right to privacy
is so broad that it shields a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy.95 Yet, the right to privacy protects much more than the
decision to have a child.' 96 In Loving v. Virginia, the Court held that the
right to privacy shielded an individual's decision of whom to marry.'97 In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court extended the right to privacy
to protect a person's decision to live with members of her extended
family. 9" Despite this, the Washington State Supreme Court has
suggested in dicta that the right to privacy does not encompass the fruits
of a couple's decision to combine sperm and donor eggs in an effort to
create a family.' 99 This flatly contradicts the recognized historic breadth
of the right to privacy and, if followed, would render meaningless eighty
years of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Rather than depending on biology, courts should look to the intimate
nature of the decision to create a family by using assisted reproduction
and determine that the Constitution protects the interests of both gamete
and non-gamete providers. As the U.S. Supreme Court determined in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Constitution protects highly
192. See supra Part 1.
193. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
194. See id. (emphasis added and omitted).
195. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
196. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (extending the right to privacy to the
decision of whom to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (extending
the right to privacy to family living arrangements).
197. SeeLoving, 388 U.S. at 12.
198. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
199. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (2002).
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personal relationships that "attend the creation and sustenance of a
family."2 0 The creation of preembryos using assisted reproduction is a
highly personal one that attends the creation and sustenance of a family
and is, therefore, protected by the Constitution. Courts following the
dicta in Litowitz would inappropriately make the constitutional right to
privacy dependent on biology in contradiction of well-established
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Instead, courts should rely on an
individual's intent to find that the constitutional right to privacy protects
both gamete and non-gamete providers' interests when they create
preembryos with the intent to become a parent.
C. Courts Should Look to the Intent of the Parties at the Time They
Created the Preembryos
Intent is the most practical and fair method for determining privacy
rights. Courts faced with resolving preembryo disputes should analogize
the issue to family law, where parentage disputes are determined by
intent.20' In parentage disputes, biological connections are often legally
meaningless. For example, individuals with absolutely no biological
connection are forced to uphold their parental responsibilities if they
intended to become a parent when they used assisted reproduction,2 2
while individuals who do have a biological connection are denied any
parenting rights whatsoever if they lacked the initial intent to become a
parent.203 In In re Marriage of Buzzanca, a California court forced
parentage obligations on a man for a child with whom he had no
biological connection, because that child would not have been born but
for the man's intent to create a family using donor sperm, donor eggs and
a surrogate.20 4 In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court
denied parentage rights to a surrogate mother because she lacked the
200. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
201. Seesupra Part Ill.
202. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(applying the intent doctrine to force parental obligations on a man with no biological connection to
a child); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356 (2000) (stating that a husband who
consented to assisted reproduction by his wife is the father of a resulting child even if he did not
provide the sperm).
203. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993) (using the intent doctrine to deny
parentage rights to the surrogate mother and grant them to the intended mother); see also UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT, § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (2000) (stating that a gamete donor is not a parent to a child
conceived by assisted reproduction).
204. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293-94.
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intent to become a parent.20 5 Despite having gestated and given birth to
the child, the surrogate mother's biological connection was insufficient
to overcome the intended mother's right to parentage 26 because the child
would not exist "[b]ut for [the] acted-on intent[]" of the intended mother
to become a parent. 27 This same approach was applied to the egg donor
situation in McDonald v. McDonald, where a New York court granted
parentage rights to the intended mother despite her ex-husband's
argument that because she did not have a genetic connection to the
children she should not have parentage rights.20 8
Similarly, courts should look to the intent of the parties in preembryo
disputes to determine whether they made the intimate decision to create a
family that falls within the zone of privacy protected by the U.S.
Constitution. In Buzzanca, Johnson, and McDonald, courts looked to the
intent of the parties to determine their parentage rights and obligations.
Preembryo disputes likewise deal with individuals who had the intent to
become parents at the time they began the process of assisted
reproduction. Therefore, courts should look to the intent of these
individuals when determining whether they have privacy interests in
their preembryos. If both parties had the intent to become parents when
they created the preembryos, then the constitutional right to privacy must
apply equally to them both. A biological connection should not steal the
shade provided by the umbrella of the constitutional right to privacy.
D. Deciding Preembryo Cases Based on Constitutional Privacy
Interests Permits Courts to Fairly Balance Parties' Competing
Interests
If courts choose to apply the constitutional right to privacy, they
should hold that it encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-
gamete providers. As illustrated by the constitutional balancing test used
in Davis v. Davis and JB. v. MB., this threshold determination enables
courts to weigh the relevant interests of both parties before making a
final decision about who has dispositional control over the
preembryos. 09 When courts determine that both parties have
205. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (NY. App. Div. 1994).
209. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715-17 (N.J. 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-
04 (Tenn. 1992).
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constitutional rights, that does not determine which party ultimately
prevails; it merely ensures that the interests of both parties will be
considered. Significantly, when courts grant one party dispositional
control over preembryos, it often enables that party to prevent his or her
ex-spouse from using the preembryos against his or her wishes. 2 ° Non-
gamete providers should have this same opportunity to prevent the unfair
disposition of preembryos they helped create.
The importance of granting constitutional rights to both gamete and
non-gamete providers can be illustrated by looking again at the
hypothetical with Leny and Eva. 21 ' For example, assume Eva embraced
the particular moral view that it would be unethical to destroy the
preembryos or to donate them to scientific research. 1 2 She and Leny
discussed this issue in detail prior to engaging the IVF clinic. They
agreed that once they had created their family they would donate any
excess preembryos to an infertile couple (though they did not sign a
contract with the IVF clinic). The preembryos would never have been
created had Eva and Leny not agreed on this point, because Eva had
made clear that she would not participate in the creation of the
preembryos if there was a chance they would ever be destroyed. If, upon
divorce, Leny wishes to have the preembryos destroyed, that desire
should not be the only interest the court hears. The court should also
consider Eva's interests, as she too participated in the intimate and highly
personal decision to have the preembryos created. The constitutional
right to privacy must protect both Leny and Eva. For a court to hold
otherwise would contradict years of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
establishing that the constitutional right to privacy is a broad shield
protecting intimate decisions central to procreation, marriage and family
life.
V. CONCLUSION
In disputes over frozen preembryos, it is inevitable that parties will
invoke the constitutional right to privacy to argue that they should have
dispositional control over the preembryos. The right to privacy protects
210. See supra Part II.
211. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 710-11 for a similar example. In J.B., the husband argued that "as
a Catholic," he would not have agreed to participate in the creation of preembryos that would
eventually be destroyed and that he and his wife had agreed "that no matter what happened the eggs
would be either utilized by us or by other infertile couples." See id. at 710.
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intimate decisions central to procreation, marriage and family life. Non-
gamete providers who decide to create preembryos with the intent to
become a parent have made an intimate decision falling squarely within
the constitutional right to privacy. Therefore, if courts choose to apply
the constitutional right to privacy to resolve preembryo disputes, they
should find that the right to privacy encompasses both gamete and non-
gamete providers. In such cases, the couple made the decision to create a
family through the use of assisted reproduction together, and the
preembryos would not exist but for that joint decision. Consequently,
courts should consider the interests of both gamete providers and non-
gamete providers who create preembryos with the intent to become
parents and refrain from granting dispositional control based solely on a
biological connection.
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